Valuing publicly sponsored research projects: Risks,scenario adjustments,and inattention |
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Authors: | Daniel R. Burghart Trudy Ann Cameron Geoffrey R. Gerdes |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Oregon Eugene, 435 PLC 1285, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA;(2) Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Washington, DC, USA |
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Abstract: | ![]() Survey-based choice scenarios used to value non-market public goods typically preclude any risk that the benefits described may not be delivered. Our survey specifies explicit risks of (a) outright program failure and (b) program redundancy due to possible private sector substitutes. Additionally, most analyses assume that survey subjects fully accept these scenarios and that all provided information receives their complete attention. Our discounted expected utility model of choice accommodates both these objective risks and the possibility of subjective scenario adjustment or selective inattention by respondents. We then counterfactually simulate willingness-to-pay in the absence of these distortions. |
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Keywords: | Failure risk Redundancy risk Scenario adjustment Inattention Stated preferences Willingness to pay R& D benefits |
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