| 企业年金委托代理理论模型及其启示 |
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| 引用本文： | 高雅琴. 企业年金委托代理理论模型及其启示[J]. 辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版), 2004, 6(6): 610-612 |
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| 作者姓名： | 高雅琴 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 阐述中国企业年金运行现状,指出中国企业年金发展缓慢,其中委托代理关系的恰当处理很大程度上影响企业年金的风险管理及其整体规模和质量的发展。进而又分析了委托代理理论的一般理论模型,由模型获得启示提出年金运营中要建立高效的企业年金治理结构、激励相容机制、补偿机制和多层次的年金运营监管体系。
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| 关 键 词： | 企业年金 委托-代理 治理结构 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-391X(2004)06-0610-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-08-30 |
Model of principal-agent problem of occupational pension and its enlightenment |
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| GAO Ya-qin. Model of principal-agent problem of occupational pension and its enlightenment[J]. Journal of Liaoning Technical University(Social Science Edition), 2004, 6(6): 610-612 |
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| Authors: | GAO Ya-qin |
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| Abstract: | The article describes the current situation and problems in the domestic operation of the occupational pension scheme.It indicates that the domestic occupational pension is developing slowly and the proper solution to the principal-agent relationship will greatly affect the risk management and the development of scale and the quality of the occupational pension.Then it investigates the model of the principal-agent relationship of the scheme,with some advice on the settlement of the principal-agent problem from the aspect of governing structure,inspiring mechanism,risk compensation mechanism and regulation. |
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| Keywords: | occupational pension principal-agent governing structure inspiring mechanism |
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