专利制度的经济学研究综述

本文旨在从关于专利制度的经济学文献中理出理论发展的内在逻辑和基本矛盾。作为知识产权系统重要组成部分的专利制度由于知识产品的特殊性而无法达到最优（first—best）。在基于最优权衡（trade-ofr）的量化分析中，经典的静态分析寻求的是给定创新报酬条件下专利长度和宽度的最佳组合，但是这样的分析起点和经济环境的预设与真实世界相距甚远。更为现实的累积性创新研究虽取得了一些成果，但是其结论却不尽相同。另一方面，实证研究表明，专利并非企业确保创新利润的首选。由此，本文认为在促进创新和改进整体社会福利方面，无论是理论上还是实践上我们应放弃对单一的专利制度的依赖，而应转向对多重政策组合的研究上。

fhe Economics of the Patent System

This paper attempts to map the logical and basic contradictions underlying the economic analysis of the patent system. The classical approach, based on quantitative methods concerning the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency, is quite removed from the real world as its environment is too static and the innovation return is presumed to be exogenously fixed. The research on cumulative innovations has taken steps towards a more realistic approach, yet its results have not been consistent. Along somewhat parallel lines, empirical studies indicate that patent is generally not the best choice by R&D firms to secure their profits from investments in innovation. This article believes therefore that whether in theory or in practice, we should end total reliance on the patent system as a means to promote innovation and the well being of the society as a whole. Attention, instead, should be switched to the study of multi-policy combinations.