同侪激励机制下政府补贴对制造商绿色研发影响的演化博弈分析

针对地方财政支付压力过大的问题,制定合理的补贴机制激励制造商绿色研发,是实现政企合作双赢的关键。在同侪激励视角下建立政府补贴和企业研发的演化博弈模型,结合静态激励和动态激励两种方案,分析双方博弈中的局部稳定性,探讨同侪激励基金、补贴系数等因素对群体演化路径的影响,从合作机制层面验证了同侪激励的可行性:较低的政府补贴支出仍能激励制造商绿色研发,较高的政府补贴支出可能导致补贴困局,动态调节的同侪激励机制可以协调政企双方不稳定的合作关系。

Evolutionary Game Analysis:Impacts of Government Subsidies on Manufacturers'Green R&D under Peer Incentive Mechanism

Due to the excessive pressure of local financial payment,the key to win-win cooperation between government and enterprises is to formulate a reasonable subsidy mechanism to stimulate manufacturers to green R&D spending.In this study,an evolutionary game model of enterprise R&D and government subsidies is established from the perspective of peer incentives.Combining the two scenarios of static and dynamic incentives,the local stability in evolutionary game is analyzed,and the effects of factors such as peer incentive funds,subsidy coefficients on the evolutionary path of the group are explored to verify the feasibility of peer incentives at the cooperative mechanism level:lower government subsidy expenditures can still motivate manufacturers to green R&D,while higher government subsidy spending may lead to subsidy trap.The dynamically adjusted peer incentive mechanism can coordinate the unstable cooperative relationship between government and enterprises.