产权性质、高管控制权与并购绩效——基于内部控制有效性的研究

以2011年成功实施并购的主并上市公司为样本,基于产权性质视角探讨内部控制、高管控制权与并购绩效的内在关系。研究结果表明：高管控制权膨胀导致上市公司并购绩效降低,且相对于非国有控股公司,国有控股公司更为强烈;完善的内部控制体系有助于并购绩效的提升,但在国有控股公司,现阶段内部控制尚不能约束高管控制权导致的绩效损害;与之相反,在非国有控股公司,内部控制在一定程度上能够限制高管控制权,提高并购绩效。

Nature of Property Rights,Executive Control Rights and M ＆ A Performance： A Study on the Effectiveness Based on Internal Control

With the Chinese listed companies that succeeded in implementing mergers and acquisition in 2011as the samples,the paper explores the internal relationship among internal control,executive control rights and M A performance under perspective of the nature of property rights. The results show that the over-expansion of executive control rights reduces the M A performance of listed companies,and the state-owned holding companies behave more strongly with respect to the non-state-owned ones. While the sound internal control system helps to improve the M A performance,the internal control still fails to constrain the performance damage caused by executive control rights at present. In the non-state-owned holding companies,conversely,the internal control can constrain executive control rights and improve M A Performance to a certain extent.