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Enforcing cooperation in public goods games: Is one punisher enough?
Institution:1. Department of Economics, Bocconi University, Italy;2. Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Italy;3. Department of Economics, University of Verona, Italy;1. Faculty of National Economy, University of Economics in Bratislava, Dolnozemska cesta 1, 852 35 Bratislava, Slovak Republic;2. College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage, 3211 Providence Drive, Anchorage, AK 99508, United States;3. Sam M. Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, United States;4. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, United States;1. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici (CMCC), Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano, Italy;2. Berlin School of Economics and Law, Badensche Str. 51, 10825 Berlin and German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Mohrenstraße 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany;1. Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA;2. Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, 3425 W.W. Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA;1. Center for Research in Experimental Economics and political Decision-making (CREED), Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre (ABC), University of Amsterdam, 1018 WT Amsterdam, The Netherlands;3. Center for Mind/Brain Sciences (Cimec), University of Trento, 38123 Mattarello, Italy;4. Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands;5. Groupe d''Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS and Lumière University Lyon 2, 93 chemin des mouilles, 69130 Ecully, France;6. Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1001 NK Amsterdam (Postbox 15916), The Netherlands
Abstract:We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public goods game setting where, in each round, access to sanctioning power is exclusively awarded to one single player per group. We show that our central ‘Top Contributors as Punishers’ institution – a mechanism by which a player needs to be the highest contributor in her group in order to earn the right to sanction others – is extremely effective in raising cooperation and welfare due to turnover in the top contributor role and to top contributors’ willingness to substantially sanction others. Our findings yield implications for the design of mechanisms intended to foster cooperation in social dilemma environments.
Keywords:Public goods games  Cooperation  Top contributors  Peer punishment  Behavioral mechanism design  2260  3020
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