Exploitation aversion: When financial incentives fail to motivate agents |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. Departments of Economics, Middlebury College, United States;2. IZA, Germany;1. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici (CMCC), Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano, Italy;2. Berlin School of Economics and Law, Badensche Str. 51, 10825 Berlin and German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Mohrenstraße 58, 10117 Berlin, Germany;1. Faculty of National Economy, University of Economics in Bratislava, Dolnozemska cesta 1, 852 35 Bratislava, Slovak Republic;2. College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage, 3211 Providence Drive, Anchorage, AK 99508, United States;3. Sam M. Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, United States;4. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, United States;1. Department of Economics, Universitat de Girona and EQUALITAS, Spain;2. Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, Luxembourg;1. Department of Economics, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Str.1, 10099 Berlin, Germany;2. CERGE-EI, Prague, Czech Republic;3. CESifo, Munich, Germany;4. GRIPS - National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan;5. Escola de Economia e Gestão and NIMA, University of Minho, 4170-057 Braga, Portugal |
| |
| Abstract: | ![]()
Studies of the principal-agent relationship find that monetary incentives work in many instances but that they can also backfire. Various mechanisms for this failure have been examined (e.g., intrinsic motivation, image concerns). We posit that an aversion to being exploited, i.e., being used instrumentally for another’s benefit, can also cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment we find that compliance is lower for exploitative principals compared to neutral ones despite using the same contracts. To corroborate our results we show that surveyed “exploitation aversion” mediates this effect. Our results have implications for the design and implementation of incentives within organizations. |
| |
| Keywords: | Financial incentives Motivation Crowding Power Exploitation Experiment C92 J33 M52 M55 |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
