规模不经济下奖惩机制对闭环供应链制造商合作策略影响

存在第三方回收商的闭环供应链中，研究了制造商规模不经情形下，政府奖惩机制对其合作策略的影响。分别构建了制造商仅与零售商（回收商）合作、制造商与零售商和回收商都合作以及均不合作四种合作策略。研究发现：制造商与零售商或回收商均存在合作动机。但是其合作动机的大小则与制造商规模不经济系数及政府奖惩力度有关。若制造商规模不经济系数较小：当政府奖惩力度较小时，制造商倾向与零售商合作；当政府奖惩力度较大时，制造商更倾向与回收商合作；若制造商规模不经济系数较大，制造商总是倾向与回收商合作。此外，无论制造商与零售商或回收商合作总是有利增加旧产品回收总量。

The Effects of Premium and Penalty Mechanism on Manufacturer's Cooperative Strategies in the Closed-loop Supply Chain with Production Diseconomies

To achieve higher supply chain efficiency and improve completive edge, the manufacturer can cooperate with other member in the closed-loop supply chain. Even though conventional wisdoms such as Nie (2012) and Ma et al. (2016) studied industry profits of different cooperative models in closed-loop supply chain, they ignored the fact that many countries set premium and penalty mechanism to order manufactures to engage in remanufacturing fields. Then scholars did not consider that situation that manufacturers maybe be under scale diseconomies as well. Therefore, the effects of premium and penalty mechanism on manufacturer's cooperative strategies in the closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a recycler under manufacturer's scale diseconomies are investigated. First, whether the manufacture has an incentive to cooperative with another member is explored. Second, we need to explore which kind of cooperation bring more profit increment for partners. Third, how different cooperation affect the industry profit is analyzed.
To settle these problems, four cooperative models based on game theory:no cooperation mode (Model N), cooperation only with the recycler (Model MC), and cooperation only with the retailer (Model MR), and cooperation with both the retailer and recycler (Model MCR) are developed. Model MCR and N just are made as benchmarks. Especially, Model MCR is the upper bound, and Model N is the bottom in these models. Through our analysis, it is found that the manufacturer always has an incentive to cooperate with recycler or retailer. However, whether it is more possible to cooperate with the retailer or recycler depends on both production diseconomies and degree of premium and penalty mechanism. If both production diseconomy and degree of premium and penalty are small, the manufacturer prefers to cooperate with the retailer. Otherwise, the manufacturer prefers to cooperate with the recycler. The relations of industry profits in different models are still decided by both production diseconomies and degree of premium and penalty mechanism. In addition, the collecting quantity of end-of-life product always improves thanks to the alliance between the manufacturer and the retailer or recycler.