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拥有自有品牌零售商的平台开放策略研究
引用本文:李佩,魏航,王广永,谈丹. 拥有自有品牌零售商的平台开放策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(3): 105-115. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.03.011
作者姓名:李佩  魏航  王广永  谈丹
作者单位:1. 上海立信会计金融学院工商管理学院, 上海 201209;2. 上海财经大学商学院, 上海 200433;3. 上海社会科学院应用经济研究所, 上海 200020
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272016,71571114);上海市哲学社会科学青年课题资助项目(2018EGL018)
摘    要:随着电子商务的快速发展,零售商之间竞争加剧,自有品牌战略成为零售商获取竞争优势的关键。研究拥有自有品牌零售商的平台开放策略,通过对比零售商不开放平台和开放平台下的均衡利润,给出零售商平台开放策略选择条件,并分析产品之间价格影响系数、固定成本和潜在需求差异系数对零售商平台开放策略选择的影响,最后结合数值分析和京东自有品牌的发展现状验证了本文的主要研究结论。研究发现:第一,随着固定成本的增加,佣金费率逐渐减少,随着潜在需求差异系数的增加,佣金费率逐渐增加;第二,当产品之间的价格影响系数较小(较大)时,平台开放(不开放)是零售商的最优选择;第三,当固定成本较小(较大)时,平台开放(不开放)是零售商的最优选择;第四,当潜在需求差异系数较小(较大)时,平台开放(不开放)是零售商的最优选择。

关 键 词:零售商  自有品牌  开放平台  不开放平台  
收稿时间:2017-07-25
修稿时间:2018-01-16

Retailer's Platform Opening Strategy for Retailer with Store Brand
LI Pei,WEI Hang,WANG Guang-yong,TAN Dan. Retailer's Platform Opening Strategy for Retailer with Store Brand[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(3): 105-115. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.03.011
Authors:LI Pei  WEI Hang  WANG Guang-yong  TAN Dan
Affiliation:1. School of Business Administration, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai 201209, China;2. College of Business, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, 200433, China;3. Institute of Applied Economics, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai, 200020, China
Abstract:With the rapid development of e-commerce and the increasing competition among retailers, store brand strategy becomes the key to gain competitive advantage. In general, retailers sell store brand products and other manufacturers' products at the same time. In e-commerce, most retailers choose to provide manufacturers with a sales platform that allows them to sell their products directly to consumers and receive commissions. For example, Dangdang.com not only sells its own brand "DANGDANG BABY", also allows other manufacturers to sell maternal and child products on its platform. However, when retailers sell store brand products and other manufacturers' products, the similarities between products may result in competition due to the proximity of products. Thus, many retailers with store brands, such as Wal-Mart and Tesco, still adopt traditional reseller model. In this way, retailers have two different strategies:first, open the platform to allow other manufacturers to sell products on the platform; second, do not open the platform, retailers purchase products form the manufacturer and then sale to consumers. Therefore, the open platform strategy of store brand retailer is examined, and the question is mainly answered in this paper:should the store brand retailer open its platform?
Existing literatures on store brand mostly study the retailer's store brand strategy and manufacturer's preventive strategy, there is studies on the open platform strategy for the retailer with store brand. Moreover, few literatures of retailer platform openness strategy consider both the demand difference of store brand and manufacturer brand, price competition, fixed costs, and the endogenous commission rate. Thus, the key contribution of our study can be summarized as follows. The potential demand differences, competition degree and fixed costs are considered at same time. The platform open strategy of store brand retailers is studied, and some theoretical comclusions are proved by taking JD.com as a case.
The paper is organized as follows:the equilibrium profit of the retailer and the manufacturer under close platform and open platform is obtained by building a linear demand function model, and then the condition of commission rate endogenous is given. Moreover, the conditions of the retailer open platform are given by comparison the equilibrium profit, and the influence of the coefficient of price influence, the fixed cost and the demand difference coefficient of store brand and manufacturer brand is analyzed. Finally, combined with numerical analysis and the development status of JD's store brand, the main conclusions of this paper are verified.
The results show that, firstly, the commission rates gradually reduce with the increase in fixed costs or the decrease in the demand difference coefficient. Secondly, the retailer prefers to open platform when the price impact coefficient, or fixed cost, or the demand difference coefficient is small, and the retailer prefers to close platform when the price impact coefficient, or fixed cost, or the demand difference coefficient is bigger. Our findings not only complement the store brand and online marketplace literature but also provide testable empirical questions on the relationship and magnitude of different factors steering the strategy choice.
Keywords:retailer  store brand  open platform  not open platform  
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