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环境规制下区域合作减排演化博弈研究
引用本文:汪明月,刘宇,杨文珂.环境规制下区域合作减排演化博弈研究[J].中国管理科学,2019,27(2):158-169.
作者姓名:汪明月  刘宇  杨文珂
作者单位:1. 中国科学院大学公共政策与管理学院, 北京 100049; 2. 中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院, 北京 100190; 3. 昆明理工大学管理与经济学院, 云南 昆明 650093
基金项目:国家重点研发计划"全球变化及应对"重点专项(2016YFA0602500);国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71473242);国家自然科学基金委应急管理资助项目(71741017)
摘    要:通过构建政府间减排演化博弈模型,模拟了无约束条件下区域内地方政府间独立减排、合作减排及在环境规制的条件下区域内地方政府独立减排的策略选择演化过程。研究发现,(1)无环境规制的独立减排情形下,先发地区减排意向薄弱,后发地区有减排意愿,但减排效果不显著;(2)合作减排时,当协同收益小于交易成本时,随着地方政府经济发展,减排博弈最终会向地方政府一方减排一方不减排的方向演进;当协同收益大于交易成本时,通过合作减排,提高了减排意愿。(3)地方政府独立减排条件下,环境规制仅在经济后发地区可以起到作用,减排效果并不显著。通过提高协同收益、减低交易成本及有效促进区域合作减排,对实现减排目标具有重要意义。

关 键 词:环境规制  区域合作  CO2减排  演化博弈  
收稿时间:2017-11-29
修稿时间:2018-04-14

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regional Cooperative Emission Reduction under Environmental Regulation
WANG Ming-yue,LIU Yu,YANG Wen-ke.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regional Cooperative Emission Reduction under Environmental Regulation[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2019,27(2):158-169.
Authors:WANG Ming-yue  LIU Yu  YANG Wen-ke
Institution:1. School of Public Policy and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China; 2. Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China; 3. Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650093, China
Abstract:It is a key step to reduce the influence of externality by coordinating the interests of the subjects in the agglomeration space and promoting interregional cooperation. Through the construction of the intergovernmental emission reduction evolutionary game model, the local government in the region under the conditions of independent emission reduction, cooperative emission reduction and environmental regulation in the region under the local government independent emission reduction strategy selection process of evolution. The study found that:(1) when the level of economic development of local government and external government are relatively small, whether it is independent emission reduction or cooperative reduction, {reduction, reduction} is local government stability strategy, however the mitigation effect is not significant; (2) In the case of independent emission reduction, when the economic level of one or both are raised to a certain degree, {emission reduction, non-emission reduction} or {non-emission reduction, emission reduction} is stability strategy of the system; (3) In the case of cooperative emission reduction, when the synergistic income is less than the transaction costs, with the local government economic development, local government's emission reduction game will eventually evolve into the situation that one side reduces emission and the other does not. If the synergistic income is greater than the transaction cost, the optimization of resources were achieved, reducing the negative effects of carbon emissions, improve the willingness of reduce emissions. (4) Due to the special characteristics of carbon emissions space product attributes, environmental regulation can't play a good effect, only in the economic backward areas can make sense, the emission reduction effect is not significant. Finally, the validity of the model is verified through a numerical simulation. By improving synergies, or reducing transaction costs, promote regional cooperation in emission reduction has great significance to achieve emission reduction targets.
Keywords:environmental regulation  regional cooperation  carbon emission reduction  evolutionary game theory  
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