项目融资中的不对称信息风险分析

从“逆向选择”和“道德风险”角度出发，对项目融资中的不对称信息风险问题进行分析，并基于信息经济学相关理论提出解决两类风险问题的具体措施：通过分离高质量与低质量项目来降低逆向选择风险；通过提高项目合同的完备性、选择信誉度高的投资主体和建立项目融资信用保证制度来降低道德风险。

Analysis of Asymmetric Information Risk in the Project Finance

The asymmetric information risk mainly lies in "reversed choice" of agents before starting the treaty and "moral risk" of agents after conducting it.From the perspective of "reversed choice" and " moral risk",the problem of asymmetric information risk in project finance is analyzed,with some measures to solve them being suggested according to the relevant theory of information economy.One measure is to reduce "reversed choice" risk by separating high quality projects from poor quality ones,the other is to drop "moral risk" by perfecting project contract,selecting the investors with high prestige and setting up the system to guarantee the credit of project finance.