基于CAPM的BOT项目“有限追索权”融资决策模型

为研究BOT项目有限追索权融资中贷款资金与股本资金在贷方和项目公司之间合理分配问题(即BOT最优融资结构),本文考虑项目公司和贷方根据CAPM方法进行投资决策,通过分析它们投资策略在利益上的冲突关系而建立一个BOT融资模型,并且用博弈论方法研究模型最优解的存在性及其性质。研究结果不仅为项目公司和贷方提供了对BOT项目融资决策的理论方法,而且为政府对BOT项目的管理提供了重要的理论工具。

A Limited Recourse Financing Model for BOT Projects Based on CAPM

BOT(Build-Operate-Transfer) has become a major project-financing schema since the 1980s.Investors of BOT projects generally include the right-interest investor(project company),who invests in the project by the equity,and the debt investor(creditor),who invests in the project by the credit.However,the limited or none recourse financing under the BOT scheme can lead to investor’s demand for different capital structures,which refer to the proportion between the debt capital and equity. The more debt or less equity in the capital structure is always beneficial to the right-interest investor because it can generate a higher return for successful projects,or lower loss for failure projects.In contrast,the lower debt is always beneficial to the debtor if the more debt can potential cause higher risk loss for failure projects.Therefore,how to determine a proper capital structure for the BOT project is the key to the success in the financing implementation. In this paper,a dynamic game model between the creditor and the project company is proposed under the implementation of limited recourse financing for the BOT project.The model is mainly based on the consideration that the creditor and the project company make investment in the project according to CAPM(Capital Asset Price Model),and the analysis of investment strategies.BOT project’s optimal capital structure on the debt-equity allocation is studied from the game theory. Firstly,a risk compensation distribution model is proposed for the BOT project according to CAPM.The model shows that risk compensation or expected revenue based on credit and equity are reasonable.In other words,the more the debt the higher the project’s failure risk is and the more the creditor’s claimed compensation or revenue is.On the other hand,the more the equity the less the project’s risk revenue is and the project company’s claimed compensation or revenue is. Secondly,the decision-investing conflict between creditor and project company is discussed based on BOT project’s risk compensation distribution model.In addition,a game model is proposed by considering debt capital and final repaid capital as decision-making variables for both parties.The model’s optimal solution and its properties indicate that the project company’s final repay under the maximization of its expected profit not only is less than the project’s maximal repay ability,but also can make the creditor’s expected profit equal to its claimed revenue in the contract,which can resolve interest conflict and increase cooperation. In summary,analysis results not only prove the feasibility and validity of limited recourse financing for the BOT project in the practice,but also theoretically resolve the conflict between the creditor and the project company on the project’s capital structure.The findings of this study not only provide the BOT project with a strategy-financing support but also offer some important theories for the government to manage the BOT project.