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不同市场能力下的“电商—平台—物流”在线销售系统的决策研究
引用本文:士明军,王勇,文悦.不同市场能力下的“电商—平台—物流”在线销售系统的决策研究[J].管理工程学报,2020(3):112-121.
作者姓名:士明军  王勇  文悦
作者单位:重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;重庆大学现代物流重庆重点实验室
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672015);国家社会科学基金重大资助项目(15ZDB169);中央高校基本科研业务费专项项目(2017CDJSK02PT09);广东省创新强校项目(2014KTSCX187)。
摘    要:近年来,随着互联网的快速发展,市场上衍生出了一些在线销售网站。考虑了一个包含电商卖家、电商平台和物流公司的在线销售系统模型,其中需求依赖于产品价格、平台和物流服务水平。研究了当物流、平台同时决策时,在线销售系统中电商卖家和平台、物流之间的不同市场能力结构问题。考虑了3种不同市场能力的分散决策模型:(1)物流-平台Stackelberg模型;(2)电商Stackelberg模型;(3)Nash模型。相关的均衡解和最优利润被得到。研究结果表明,在不同的市场能力结构下,当物流公司和平台同时决策时,即使他们的服务投入不相同,但最优收费相同。市场能力结构对在线销售成员和消费者有重要的影响。对电商而言,当市场能力较高时,会制定较低的零售价格,并获得最多的利润,同时能够提升消费者购买的积极性;当市场能力较低时,电商会制定较高的零售价格,并获得最少的利润。对平台和物流公司而言,当市场能力较高时,会制定比较高的收费,同时付出较少的努力,但并不能获得最高利润,同时会打击消费者的积极性;但是,当市场能力较低时,他们一定获得最少的利润。在Nash模型中,平台和物流公司会付出最大的努力,同时获得最大的利润,而整个在线销售系统的总利润也是最多。在物流-平台Stackelberg模型中,平台和物流公司付出的努力最少,而整个在线销售系统的总利润也最少。

关 键 词:在线销售系统  市场能力  STACKELBERG博弈  电商平台

Research on the online sales system of“online seller-platform-logistics”in different market power structures
SHI Mingjun,WANG Yong,WEN Yue.Research on the online sales system of“online seller-platform-logistics”in different market power structures[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2020(3):112-121.
Authors:SHI Mingjun  WANG Yong  WEN Yue
Institution:(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)
Abstract:With the rapid development of the Internet,e-Commerce has been spread pretty fast in recent years,such as Amazon、eBay,Alibaba and JD.At the meantime,some retailers started e-Commerce business to increase the volume of sales,and some manufacturers also sell their products online for higher sales.The prevalence of e-commerce has also led to the unprecedented development of the logistics enterprises,for instance Debon logistics and Rookie Inn.Online shopping has brought convenience to consumers,and consumers can buy them whenever and wherever they want,especially with the development of the mobile network.Therefore,an increasing number of consumers are willing to choose online shopping,Researchers have paid attention to the topic of selling online because it provides a critical market share in the overall market.In this paper,we build a selling-online game model that includes“online seller-platform-logistics.”The consumer demand depends on the product price,platform and logistics service level,where the online sellers decide the price of the goods,the logistics company determines the logistics service level as well as the logistics charge and the online platform determines the platform service level,the platform transaction fee and a fixed settlement fee(but also the platform subsidies for the seller).As the increasingly fierce competition in e-Commerce,there are some logistics platforms in the market like Jingdong home-Dada,Alibaba–a rookie in the form of logistics cooperation.Specifically,if suppliers use Jingdong home to sell their products,it means that they will use Dada logistics and distribution.It is the same case with Alibaba–rookie:selecting Alibaba e-Commerce platform means choosing rookie delivery.Based on this background,this paper studies a problem of different market capacity structures between the online seller,platform,and logistics in online selling system when logistics and platform are simultaneously decision-making.We consider the decentralized decision-making model of three different market capabilities:the logistics-platform Stackelberg,online seller Stackelberg,and NG models.The corresponding equilibrium and optimal profit of channel members are obtained in different cases.The results show that in different structures of market capacity,when the platform and logistics company make decisions simultaneously,even if their service costs are different,they still charge the same fees.The structure of market power has a significant influence on online selling members.For online sellers,when the market power is high,they will set lower retail price,obtain the maximum profit,and improve the purchasing enthusiasm of consumers.When the market power is low,they will set the higher retail price and obtain the least profit.For platform and logistics company,when the market power is high,they will set high fees and make fewer efforts,but they will not get the highest profits,and the purchasing enthusiasm of consumers also falls.However,when market power is low,they must get the least profit.Finally,we find that the platform and logistics company make every effort to obtain the maximum profit,and the online selling system achieves its highest profit in the NG model.Platform and logistic company make the least efforts,and the online selling system achieves the minimum profit in logistics and platform Stackelberg model.Finally,through the sensitivity analysis of some key parameters,we obtain some meaningful management implications.The increasing consumer demand for online shopping and consumer sensitivities to services are beneficial to members of the online selling system.Meanwhile,members of the online selling system provide better service to promote consumer utility,and those members of the online selling system benefit themselves.However,with the increase in logistics service cost,the profit of members in online selling system goes down.Accordingly,the improvement of service is beneficial to both consumers and members of the online selling system.
Keywords:Online sales system  Market power  Stackelberg game  Electronic business platform
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