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基于相对浮动价和政府补贴的订单农业协调机制研究
引用本文:余星,张卫国,刘勇军. 基于相对浮动价和政府补贴的订单农业协调机制研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2020, 0(3): 134-141
作者姓名:余星  张卫国  刘勇军
作者单位:华南理工大学工商管理学院;湖南人文科技学院数学与金融学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金国际(地区)合作与交流重点资助项目(71720107002);广东省自然科学基金研究团队项目(2017A030312001);广州市金融服务创新与风险管理研究基地(2018);中央高校科研基本业务费重点项目(2017ZD102)。
摘    要:考虑政府提供农户生产成本补贴问题,首先构建公司在不同产品质量浮动收购价格模式下,农户、公司和政府的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型。然后给出最大期望收益目标下农户最优生产规模、公司最优浮动收购价格和社会福利最大化的政府最优补贴率的显式表达式,并分析参数对三方(农户、公司和社会福利)利益的影响。最后进行数值分析,验证了理论结果并进一步得出了相关参数变化的影响。研究结果表明:最优生产规模、农户和公司的收益受政府补贴率、不同质量产品价格浮动幅度、自然条件风险的影响。建议政府给农户提供生产成本补贴以激励农户扩大生产规模,从而提高农户和公司收益;为了协调农户和公司利益,建议在好质量产品比例较高时,差质量产品降价幅度可以大于好质量产品价格增加幅度;而当差质量产品比例较高时,差质量产品降价幅度可以小于好质量产品价格增加幅度。

关 键 词:STACKELBERG博弈  政府补贴  产出风险  相对浮动价

A coordinate mechanism of contract-farming based on relative floating price and government subsidies
YU Xing,ZHANG Weiguo,LIU Yongjun. A coordinate mechanism of contract-farming based on relative floating price and government subsidies[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2020, 0(3): 134-141
Authors:YU Xing  ZHANG Weiguo  LIU Yongjun
Affiliation:(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640 China;Mathematics and Finance,Hunan University of Humanities,Science and Technology,Loudi 417000,China)
Abstract:In the present,the form of the agricultural subsidy granted by the government is commonly direct,given the shortage of this kind of direct subsidy,in reality,this paper changes the form of direct subsidy to the form of indirect subsidy for the government to provide the production cost of farmers.As everyone knows,Chinese agriculture belongs to the typical climate agriculture;the weather is the main feature of Chinese agriculture.That is,natural considerations greatly influences the actual production of agricultural products.Also,through investigation and research,we find out that in the practice of order agriculture,the company usually determines different purchase prices based on the quality of different agricultural products.Based on the above reality,in order to improve the efficiency of government subsidies and coordinate the development offarmers+companytype order agriculture,this paper first sets up a three-phase(including a farmer,a company and a government)Stackelberg game model under the mode of floating purchasing price with regard to different product qualities.In the proposed model,the farmer decides the optimal scale of production to achieve his maximum profit,the company decides the floating purchasing price to maximize its profit,and the government designs the subsidy rate aiming to improve the social wealth.Then,the explicit expressions of the optimal scale of production,the floating purchasing price,and the subsidy rate are derived.Moreover,this paper presents the effects of model parameters on the optimal scale of production,and the interests of the three parties.Finally,a numerical analysis is carried out to verify the theoretical results,and obtain the influences of related parameters.The study results show that the optimal scale of production and the profits both of the farmer and the company are affected by the floating purchasing price,the subsidy rate,and the natural conditions.Specifically,the optimal scale of production is increasing with the proportion of good quality products,the subsidy rate,and the increase in the purchase price of the good quality products,while decreasing the volatility of the natural condition and the decrease in the purchase price of the poor quality products.The profit of the farmer increases with increasing the proportion of good quality products,the increase in the purchase price of the good quality products,and the subsidy rate while decreasing with the volatility of the natural condition and the decrease in the purchase price of the poor quality products.Besides,the profit of the company is increasing(decreasing)with increasing of the proportion of good quality products,the decrease in the purchase price of the poor quality products and the subsidy rate(the volatility of the natural condition and the increase in the purchase price of the good quality products).We suggest that the government provide the farmer with production cost subsidies to encourage the farmer to expand production scale,thereby to increase the profits of the farmer and the company.To coordinate the interests of the farmer and the company,we also advise that the price range of poor quality products can be greater than that of good quality products when the proportion of good quality products is higher.Otherwise,the price range of inferior quality products can be lower than that of good quality products.
Keywords:Stackelberg game  Government subsidies  Output risk  Relative floating price
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