关系治理、第三方介入对农地流转租金的影响——基于CLES的经验证据

流转租金的市场化是农地要素市场发育的重要表征,当前我国农地市场中租金的价格形成机制并不完善。以转出方面临的流转事后交易费用为理论分析起点,基于2020年中国土地经济调查(CLES)收集的1648个农地流转样本,采用OLS、2SLS和CMP等方法实证检验了关系治理对流转租金的影响以及县和乡镇政府、村委会等第三方介入对关系治理格局的改变和租金决定的作用。研究结果显示:流转双方的关系越紧密,信任和声誉机制约束发挥作用的强关系治理能够减少事后交易费用,双方就这部分交易费用进行博弈使得流转租金低于市场价格;县和乡镇政府、村委会等第三方介入流转,替代了关系治理在减少交易费用方面的作用,改变了熟人社会的关系治理格局,流转租金接近于市场价格。

Impact of relationship governance,third party intervention on farmland transfer rents:Empirical evidence based on CLES

The marketization of transfer rent is an important symbol of the development of farmland factor market.At present,the price formation mechanism of rent in China’s farmland market is not perfect.Based on the theoretical analysis starting with the post transaction cost of leasers,this paper uses 1648 farmland transfer samples collected by China Land Economic Survey(CLES) in 2020,and employs OLS,2 SLS and CMP methods to empirically test the impact of relationship governance on transfer rent and the role of third-party(including county and township governments and village committees) intervention on the change of relationship governance pattern and rent decisions.The results show that the close relationship between the two sides of transfer represents the strong relationship governance functioned by the constraints of trust and reputation mechanism,which can reduce the post transaction cost.And the two sides play a game on this part of transaction cost,making the transfer rent lower than the market price.Furthermore,the involvement of third parties such as county and township governments and village committees in the transfer has replaced the role of relationship governance in reducing transaction cost,and changed the relationship governance pattern of acquaintance society,which makes the transfer rent close to the market price.