行政干预、一二级市场分歧与IPO定价效率

在中国新股发行制度第三阶段改革过程中,监管部门针对"超募"发行市盈率"存量股转让"实施了一系列行政干预。从一、二级市场分歧和IPO定价效率两个方面进行实证研究发现：在发行价格相对于股权价值存在普遍溢价的现实情况下,行政干预提高了IPO发行定价的内在价值定价效率,但大幅降低了交易价值定价效率;行政干预扩大了一、二级市场定价分歧,形成了制度型的利益输送渠道。研究结论表明,监管部门对IPO定价的行政干预中断了中国新股发行体制第三阶段改革的市场化进程,未来完善中国新股发行制度的方向应坚持市场化方向,以提升定价效率为目标,并处理好融资者和投资者之间的利益关系。

Administrative intervention, disagreement between the first and secondary market, and IPO pricing efficiency

During the third stage of China'' initial public offering (IPO) mechanism reform, regulators carried out a series of administrative interventions aimed at over-financing, P/E ratio and secondary offering problems. Focusing on the disagreement between the first and secondary market, and IPO pricing efficiency, the empirical results suggest that, firstly, administrative intervention improved the intrinsic value pricing efficiency, but substantially reduced the transaction value pricing efficiency, under the circumstances of widespread premium of IPO price over the equity value; secondly, administrative intervention enlarged the disagreement in equity pricing between the first and secondary market, which formed an institutional profit transfer channel. The research results indicate that the administrative interventions on IPO pricing interrupt the marketization process of the third stage of China''s IPO mechanism reform. IPO mechanism reform in the future should adhere to the market-oriented direction, target at improvement of pricing efficiency and handle the relationship between the interests of financiers and investors properly.