首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

机构股东积极主义博弈分析及政策建议
引用本文:殷红春,曹玉贵. 机构股东积极主义博弈分析及政策建议[J]. 北京理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 8(3): 58-61
作者姓名:殷红春  曹玉贵
作者单位:1.天津大学管理学院,天津300072
摘    要:
“股东积极主义”已经演进成为西方证券市场的一个重要特征。本文根据经济博弈论分析了机构投资者积极参与公司治理的条件。通过博弈分析表明,机构投资者积极参与公司治理的动力主要取决于成本与收益的比较,具体决定于机构投资者的持股比例、持股时间和监督成本等。同时基于博弈分析的结果,提出了提高我国机构投资者积极参与公司治理动力的政策建议。

关 键 词:机构投资者   股东积极主义   博弈分析   政策建议
文章编号:1009-3370(2006)03-0058-04
收稿时间:2005-09-12
修稿时间:2005-09-12

Game Analysis on Institutional Shareholder Activism and Suggestion
Yin Hong-chun and Cao Yu-gui. Game Analysis on Institutional Shareholder Activism and Suggestion[J]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition), 2006, 8(3): 58-61
Authors:Yin Hong-chun and Cao Yu-gui
Affiliation:1.School of management Tianjin University,Tianjin,3000722.North China Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power,Zhengzhou 450045
Abstract:
"Institutional Shareholder Activism"has become an important feature in Western securities market.According to economy game,the condition of institutional investor actively participating in corporate governance is analyzed in this paper.It shows that the motive force of institutional investor actively participating in corporate governance depends on the comparison of costs and revenues,to be more specific,on the proportion of shares,the length of share-holding and supervising costs,etc.Meanwhile,suggestions are proposed based on the result of game analysis on how to raise the motive force of China's institutional investor actively participating in corporate governance.
Keywords:institutional investor  shareholder activism  game analysis  suggestion
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号