Picking Winners? Evidence on NATO’s Enlargement Strategy |
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Authors: | Schweickert Rainer Melnykovska Inna Heitmann Hanno |
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Institution: | (1) Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany;(2) Institute for Social Sciences, Christian-Albrechts-University, Kiel and Institute for East-European Studies, Free University, Berlin, Germany |
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Abstract: | The effectiveness of NATO conditionality for institutional reforms is highly controversial. Some papers argue that any effect
this conditionality might have had may be due to endogeneity effects, i.e. NATO may have picked the winners. We argue that
this is not the case. First, NATO-Mazedonia relations provide a case in point. Macedonia was granted entry into the Membership
Action Plan (MAP) in 1999 due to country’s strategic importance. Only after the Ohrid agreement, effective conditionality
set in and marked a switch in NATO strategy from security only towards institution building. Second, this is supported by
econometric evidence based on panel data. An event study reveals that entry into NATO’s accession process was mainly driven
by neighbourhood and good relations with the West. We conclude that empirical evidence clearly supports a stronger role of
NATO’s political agenda, i.e., low entry barriers but strict accession conditionality. |
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