道路交通客运企业车辆产权改革的演化博弈分析

由于历史原因和资金限制等因素,我国道路交通客运企业中挂靠车辆在运营车辆中占很大比重.挂靠经营模式在一定程度上是行业安全事故频发、道路运输市场混乱的诱因.道路交通客运企业实施车辆产权改革,其实质就是利益相关者之间的博弈问题.通过建立挂靠车辆产权改革的演化博弈模型并调节相关参数值,使得在车辆产权改革过程中,挂靠车主的行为选择可以朝着道路交通客运企业希望的方向演化,以利于企业制定既符合实际又同时能满足博弈双方利益诉求的产权改革方案,减轻改革的阻力,降低改革的成本.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Vehicle Property Reform of Road Passenger Transport Enterprises

In China, due to historical reasons, capital constraints and other factors, the affiliated vehicles account for a large share of passenger transport enterprises＇ operating vehicles. To some extent, affiliating oper- ation model is an incentive for safety accidents and disorder of road transport market. Road passenger transport enterprises implement property reform of vehicles and its essence is the game between stakeholders. We can build evolutionary game model of property rights reform of affiliated vehicles and adjust relevant parameter val- ues, so the behaviors choices of owners of affiliated vehicles will evolve in the direction of passenger transport enterprises ＇ hope in the property rights reform. It will be beneficial to the road passenger transport enterprises to formulate property rights reform, which is realistic and can meet the interest requirements between the game players. It will also reduce the opposition and the cost of the reform.