| 国有企业外部董事激励机制对外部董事行为的影响——基于博弈论的理论模型分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 孙玥璠,杨有红,张真昊.国有企业外部董事激励机制对外部董事行为的影响——基于博弈论的理论模型分析[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2011(4):62-68. |
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| 作者姓名： | 孙玥璠 杨有红 张真昊 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京工商大学商学院;北京大学光华管理学院;中国人民大学商学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 北京市教委社科计划重点项目“市属国有独资公司外部董事与董事会运作机制完善”(SZ201110011007);北京市教委科技创新平台-首都企业集团财务与会计研究基地项目;北京市属高校人才强教“高层次人才资助计划”项目“会计与投资者保护”(PHR20100512);北京市属高等学校科学技术与研究生教育创新工程建设项目;北京工商大学青年教师科研启动基金项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 国有企业董事会试点改革有助于破解中国国企改革这个世界性难题,而具有中国特色的外部董事制度是此次试点改革的重要组成部分。基于此,运用"委托—代理"理论,结合我国国情,构建国有企业外部董事激励机制的博弈论模型,用以分析我国国有企业外部董事激励的特殊问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 外部董事 激励机制 国企改革 博弈论 |
The Effect of Incentive Mechanism for Outside Directors in State-Owned Business upon their Behaviors: An Analysis of Theoretical Model based on Game Theory |
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| Sun Yue-fan,Yang You-hong,& Zhang Zhen-hao.The Effect of Incentive Mechanism for Outside Directors in State-Owned Business upon their Behaviors: An Analysis of Theoretical Model based on Game Theory[J].Journal of Beijing Technology and Business University:Social Science,2011(4):62-68. |
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| Authors: | Sun Yue-fan Yang You-hong & Zhang Zhen-hao |
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| Institution: | 1.Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China; 2.Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China; 3.Business School,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China) |
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| Abstract: | The pilot reform of state-owned enterprise board is beneficial to solve the global problem about China’s state-owned enterprise reform.The outside director system with Chinese characteristics is the crucial part of the reform.Based on Principal-Agent Theory,this paper constructs a model of incentive mechanism for the outside directors in the state-owned enterprises and analyzes the special issue of outside director incentives in China. |
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| Keywords: | outside director incentive mechanism state-owned enterprise reform game theory |
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