| Abstract: | ![]()
This article attempts to narrow the range of moral disagreement surrounding the issue of abortion by exploring current assumptions and comparing thinking about abortion with our thinking about death. Focusing the abortion debate on questions such as when life begins or whether the fetus is a person has thrust us into scientific uncertainty and definitional disputes. It is suggested that the focus of the debate should be shifted to the issue of whether the fetus merits our protection. Moral judgements regarding personhood represent a complex balancing that involves weighing our interests in protecting an entity against the loss to our liberty implied by such protection. This approach requires a Copernican revolution in our thinking about abortion, in which 3 major factors--the nature of the entity, the impact of its mistreatment on our broadest human interests, and the specific implications of its protection for our liberty--are considered in a relational whole. Similarly, the continuum in the dying process requires us to determine which aspect of human death will be recognized as morally significant. Since determinations with regard to life and death are arbitrary, societies must select their own moral values and take responsibility for collective moral decisions. It is concluded that the US Supreme Court decision that allows free access to abortion in the 1st trimester, imposes a requirement of medical supervision in the 2nd, and prohibits abortion in most cases in the 3rd trimester represents a reasonable response to the moral issues at stake. |
