博弈论视角下我国粮食储备主体行为研究

作为我国粮食储备承储主体的农户和地方粮企在粮食宏观调控中具有重要作用,但其常在自身利益驱动下进行储备粮的逆向操作,严重影响了政策的调控效果。针对不同粮食承储主体分别构建博弈模型,结果表明：农户主体的储粮行为有着极大模仿性和趋同性;农户对未来粮食价格的非理性预期是导致其逆向操作行为的重要原因;政府应引导农户形成对未来粮价的理性预期,并通过实施满足一定条件的储粮补贴政策来影响农户收益水平最终影响农户决策。对于粮储企业主体,证明了其逆向操作行为是追求利益最大化目标下的必然选择结果,无外界干预下的博弈最终会导致粮食储备调控效果大打折扣,因此政府应鼓励中储粮发挥＂领导者＂作用去影响粮企预期或引入外部政策补贴来影响博弈收益,对粮企形成正向引导和激励,使执行粮储调控政策成为企业人收益最大化目标下的最优选择,从根本上规避粮企逆向操作问题。

Study on Behavior of Subject of Grain Reserve in China from Perspective of Game Theory

As the main subjects of China＇s grain reserves,farmers and local grain enterprises play an important role in ensuring food security, but they are often driven by self-interest to perform reverse op- erations,which thus seriously influences the effects of national grain reserve macro-control policy. This paper, based on different grain reserve subjects, builds the Game Model. The result shows that as for farmers, their grain reserve behaviors have a great imitation and convergence characteristics, and their ir- rational expectation of future food prices is an important reason for their reverse behaviors. Government should both guide farmers to form rational expectations about the future food prices and affect farmer＇s income so as to affect their final decision through subsidy policy of grain reserve. As for the main grain reserve enterprises,this paper proves that their reverse operation behaviors are the inevitable result of the pursuit of maximization profit and the game without outside intervention will ultimately cause the reduction of effect of food reserve policy control. Therefore, government should encourage the China Grain Reserves Corporation to play the leading role in influencing grain enterprises＇ expectation or intro- duce the policy subsidies to influence the game＇s proceeds and form positive guidance and incentives for grain enterprises, which will make the implementation of grain storage policy become the optimal choice under their maximization interests,and fundamentally avoid the reverse operation of grain enterprises.