实显性与视域性——论胡塞尔《观念1》时期的突破及意义

胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》中做出了实显性意义上的现象学突破，但是这样的一种突破不仅在胡塞尔看来，而且在德里达、海德格尔与马里翁看来，是不足的或者是成问题的。那么，问题的关键便变为了如何看待这一问题的现象学意义，正是在这里，海德格尔与马里翁也产生了不同的阐释倾向，从而以此为始基走向了不同的还原道路，亦即由被给予性或者存在所趋动的还原道路。但是，他们似乎又并没有忠实于胡塞尔自身的努力与道路，亦即并没有如胡塞尔一样对待实显性问题与视域性问题之间的关联。本文试图通过分析几种解释倾向的意义与关联，更加明晰地看出胡塞尔《观念1》时期的努力意图及其通向更为深层次还原的可能性。

Actuality and Horizon: Husserl's Breakthrough and its Significance during the Period of his Writing of The Idea of Phenomenology(1)

The breakthrough made by Husserl in Logical Investigations is called a breakthrough of actuality. But not only Husserl, but also Derrida, Heidegger and Marion have regarded this breakthrough inadequate or problematic. Then, the key to the problem has become how to treat the phenomenological significance of this problem. It is here that Heidegger and Marion have different interpretations, which as a starting point leads them to a different path of reduction. It is the reduction driven by the Givenness or Being. However, it seems that they do not remain faithful to Husserl''s own efforts and path, that is, they do not treat the relevance between the issue of actuality and that of horizon as Husserl did. This article attempts to analyze the meaning and connection of several tendencies in their interpretation to make clear the intention of Husserl''s efforts in the period of his writing of The Idea of Phenomenology (1) and the possibility of a deeper reduction.