| 委托代理视阈下世界遗产地实行特许经营的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘慧媛,赵黎明.委托代理视阈下世界遗产地实行特许经营的博弈分析[J].西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2011,21(3):42-45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘慧媛 赵黎明 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学管理与经济学部,天津,300072 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目;项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 经营权问题是世界遗产地管理研究中倍受关注的话题。文章基于世界遗产地实行特许经营中的委托代理关系,运用博弈论分别构建了静态博弈和重复博弈模型来分析了这一过程中世界遗产管理机构与被授权企业的行为方式,分别探讨了基于委托人监督力度和代理人经营目标的决策策略,结论表明世界遗产管理机构加强监督的策略是维持这一委托代理关系的首要条件,而监督的力度主要取决于监督成本、代理成本和惩罚成本。
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| 关 键 词： | 世界遗产地 特许经营 委托—代理 博弈论 |
Franchising Applied to World Heritage Based on of Principle-agency Analysis |
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| LIU HUIYUAN,ZHAO LIMING.Franchising Applied to World Heritage Based on of Principle-agency Analysis[J].Journal of Xidian University (Social Sciences Edition),2011,21(3):42-45. |
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| Authors: | LIU HUIYUAN ZHAO LIMING |
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| Institution: | LIU HUIYUAN,ZHAO LIMING(Management College,Tianjin University,Tianjin,300072,.China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the principle-agency relationship in implementation of franchising in World Heritage,the paper constructs static game and dynamic repeated game model with game theory to analyze the strategies of World Heritage management agencies and authorized companies in this process,and concludes that the enhancement of supervision strength is the most critical measure to make franchising policy applicable in this context.While the monitoring power is mainly influenced by supervision costs and agency costs. |
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| Keywords: | World heritage Franchising Game theory Principle-agency |
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