| 审计委员会治理：防范校企合作创新中逆向选择风险的作用 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴清华,王平心.审计委员会治理：防范校企合作创新中逆向选择风险的作用[J].管理工程学报,2008,22(1):137-139. |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴清华 王平心 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 复旦大学管理学院博士后流动站,上海,200433;中国华融资产管理公司博士后科研工作站,北京,100045
2. 杭州电子科技大学,浙江,杭州,310018 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金
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全国教育科学规划项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文运用博弈论基本原理和模型,描述了校企合作创新中技术交易行为的整个博弈均衡过程.指明和阐释了逆向选择现象的形成机理,进而探讨如何发挥审计委员会等的监督和治理作用,以降低和防范逆向选择行为的发生.
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| 关 键 词： | 校企合作技术创新 博弈分析 逆向选择 防范 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-6062(2008)01-0137-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年11月24 |
Governance of Audit Committee: To Control Adverse Selection Risk of Collaborative Technology Innovation between Firms and Colleges |
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| WU Qing-hua,WANG Ping-xin.Governance of Audit Committee: To Control Adverse Selection Risk of Collaborative Technology Innovation between Firms and Colleges[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2008,22(1):137-139. |
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| Authors: | WU Qing-hua WANG Ping-xin |
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| Abstract: | This paper uses game theory and model to analyze the whole game equilibrium process in the technology transaction in the collaborative technology innovation between firms and colleges.It also analyzes the causality of adverse selection,and discusses how to prevent it by the governance of audit committee. |
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| Keywords: | collaborative technology innovation between firms and colleges game analysis adverse selection prevention |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
