Anticipating Likely Consequences of Lottery‐Based Affirmative Action*

Objectives. To better understand the consequences of whole or partial reliance on test scores as a screening mechanism for college or university admissions or for job placement or promotion. Methods. We introduce a simple hurdles/threshold model to study one particular mechanism that has been recently proposed to generate a “compromise” between race‐normed or gender‐normed standards for acceptance, on the one hand, and the decision to select those with the highest score regardless of race or gender, on the other—a method we call lottery‐based rules with minimum thresholds of acceptance. Results. We show the factors that determine how close acceptance rates for the disadvantaged group under lottery‐based methods will be to the acceptance rates under either race‐normal or pretest‐score‐based mechanisms. Conclusions. We argue that the likely consequences of using this method are not nearly as attractive as they might first appear to reformers.