| 产品市场竞争、高管激励与过度投资的相关关系分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄金曦,张平平.产品市场竞争、高管激励与过度投资的相关关系分析[J].重庆理工大学学报(社会科学版),2016(2):62-68. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄金曦 张平平 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆理工大学 会计学院,重庆,400054 |
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| 摘 要： | 以2010—2014年我国沪、深两市的3184个上市 A 股面板数据为样本，基于产品市场竞争的视角分析了高管激励对过度投资的影响。结果表明：我国过度投资现象仍然广泛存在，产品市场竞争和高管激励均能抑制企业过度投资行为，并且产品市场竞争越激烈，高管激励对过度投资的影响程度越小，说明我国产品市场竞争和高管激励对过度投资的影响具有相互替代的作用。
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| 关 键 词： | 产品市场竞争 高管激励 过度投资 |
Relative Relationship Analysis of Product Market Competition and Executive Incentive to Excessive Investment |
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| Authors: | HUANG Jin-xi ZHANG Ping-ping |
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| Abstract: | In 2010-2014,taking China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed on the 3184 panel data as the sample,the influence of executives’excessive incentives to overinvestment was analyzed based on the product market competition perspective.The results show that:the phenomenon of ex-cessive investmentis is still wide spreaded,and the product market competition and executive incen-tive could inhibit over-investment behavior,and the more intense market competition,the smaller the incentive for excessive investment executives degree of influence,indicating that the product market of competition and executive incentive effect on the over-investment have mutually irreplaceable role. |
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| Keywords: | product market competition executive incentive overinvestment |
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