移动应用安全监管中的合谋博弈分析与建议

移动应用安全状况日益凸显,亟需采取相应的监管策略.基于完全信息三方静态博弈模型,探讨移动应用安全监管中政府、移动应用商店以及移动应用开发商三者之间的博弈决策问题.政府通过对应用商店的监管发现存在应用商店与开发商合谋的情况.对于减少应用商店与开发商合谋,政府可给予应用商店未来的合作机会等间接激励,其作用优于现金支持的直接激励.而有效控制监管成本,增加应用商店和开发商合谋所产生的损失,是减少应用商店与开发商合谋概率的有效途径.从博弈角度出发,提出了政府从移动应用传播渠道入手的安全监管策略,即政府在何种条件下能更好发挥通过应用商店间接监管的作用.

Game Analysis and Suggestions of the Supervision for Mobile Application Security

With the growing mobile application security problem, it is necessary to provide effective supervision for China APP security. Based on the tripartite complete information static game model, the authors discussed how to prevent the collusive behaviors between mobile application stores and application developers through the government''s supervision in the mobile application security regulation. We founded that the indirect incentive to mobile application store such as cooperation opportunities which is provided by government is better than direct funding incentive including cash incentives.And the key to reduce the probability of collusive behaviors between mobile application store and application developers is controlling the regulatory costs effectively and increasing the loss when the conspiracy was found between the app stores and the developers. In conclusion,it is found that the government under some conditions can better play the role of indirect regulation through the app store.