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自然垄断产业多元化的厂商合谋:假设及论证
引用本文:侯风云,张凤兵,王会宗.自然垄断产业多元化的厂商合谋:假设及论证[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(5).
作者姓名:侯风云  张凤兵  王会宗
作者单位:山东大学经济学院,济南,250100
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究基地基金,教育部科学技术研究项目
摘    要:自然垄断产业的特性决定了市场结构改革的方向只能是寡头垄断。但是,在这种市场结构下,由于厂商数目少,特别容易达成合谋。合谋有利于在位厂商,但不利于社会福利增进。这便违背自然垄断产业多元化改革实现厂商效率和社会福利水平增进的初衷。在假定自然垄断产业多元化后在位厂商合谋存在的基础上,对合谋机制、现实性及其成本进行了论证。

关 键 词:自然垄断  多元化  合谋  博弈

Collusion in the Diversification of Natural Monopoly Industry: Hypothesis and Argumentation
HOU Feng-yun,ZHANG Feng-bing,WANG Hui-zong.Collusion in the Diversification of Natural Monopoly Industry: Hypothesis and Argumentation[J].Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences),2008(5).
Authors:HOU Feng-yun  ZHANG Feng-bing  WANG Hui-zong
Abstract:The special attribute of natural monopoly implicates that the market structure reform must be targeted at oligopoly.However,under oligopoly where only a few firms exist,collusion will be easily sustained.Collusion benefits existing firms but is detrimental to social welfare improvement,which definitely runs against ultimate goal of diversifying natural monopoly industry to enhance firm efficiency and social welfare.Moreover,the increasing returns to scale and subadditivity of cost that characterize natural monopoly will be easily destroyed.Based on the hypothesis that collusion will be sustained in the wake of diversification reform in natural monopoly industry,this paper studies the mechanism,the possibility and the costs of collusion.
Keywords:natural monopoly  diversification  collusion  game
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