多任务环境下的创业投资家激励合约研究

在中国现行创业投资基金运作中,创业投资家通常同时进行着政府指定项目和自选项目的投资。文章在这一多任务环境下分析了三种不同组织模式下针对创业投资家的激励合约设计问题。主要结论包括:(1)若任务间的重要性存在差异,或不同任务产出的分布正相关,则不同任务间的激励强度并不必然互补,从而拓展了Holmstrom和Milgrom的经典结论;(2)若让不同的创业投资基金分别从事政府指定项目和自选项目的投资,则作为委托人的政府能获得更高的收益;若进一步引入相对业绩比较,则委托人获取的收益将更高。

A Study on Incentive Contracts for Venture Capitalists in Multitask Environment

In Chinese venture capital funds,Venture capitalists usually invested in the government’s designated projects and their own choosing items at the same time.Under this multi-tasking environment,the paper analyzes the incentive contract design problem for venture capitalists in three different organizational models.The main conclusions are: 1) If the importance among tasks is difference,or output distribution of different tasks is positive correlated,then the incentive intensity between different tasks does not necessarily complement each other,which extends Holmstrom and Milgrom’s classic conclusion;2) If different venture capital fund engaged in government’s designated projects and its own selecting items separately,then as the principal,the government could get higher net surplus in this specialization pattern;In particular,the principal would be benefited by introducing relative performance comparison in specialization pattern.