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隐含合约和专用资产投资:日本分包制研究
作者单位:华中师范大学数学与统计学学院 武汉430079(王芬),复旦大学经济学院 上海200433(肖超虎)
摘    要:日本制造业中,制造商往往和其零部件供应商形成长期连续交易关系,彼此之间紧密协作,形成系列化的企业集团。在这种企业集团内部,零部件供应商有更大的激励进行专用资产的投资,进而降低生产成本,提高产品质量。甚至在适当的条件下,供应商直接参与零部件产品的设计。这种日本式的分包制采用一种隐含的承包合约形成长期连续交易关系,使企业之间能更好的合作,极大的提高了日本企业集团的竞争力。本文建立一个简单的模型,引入一种简单隐含合约的形式,即发包商给予承包商部分议价权利,在此基础上分析承包商专用资产投资行为,并对上述现象进行解释。

关 键 词:日本分包制  隐含承包合约  专用资产投资  议价能力  潜在市场

Implicit Contract and Specialized Asset Investment:a Study on Japanese Subcontracting
Authors:WANG Fen  XIAO Chao-hu
Institution:WANG Fen1,XIAO Chao-hu2
Abstract:In Japan, manufacturers usually develop a long partnership with their suppliers and make continuous deal with each other to form a knit cooperation. Within this kind of relationship, the suppliers are motivated more to invest in the specialized asset to improve the product quality and efficiency of the producing. They even take part in the design of products sometimes. This is so-called Japan-style Subcontracting where implicit contract is very popular. This paper will use a simple form of implicit contracts where suppliers have great negotiation power to analyze why the suppliers would like to invest in specialize asset.
Keywords:Japan-style subcontracting  implicit contract  specialized asset investment  negotiation power  potential market
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