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垄断企业捆绑销售的策略效应
引用本文:叶泽,喻苗. 垄断企业捆绑销售的策略效应[J]. 长沙理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2005, 20(4): 54-57
作者姓名:叶泽  喻苗
作者单位:长沙理工大学,管理学院,长沙,410076
摘    要:捆绑销售作为企业常用的销售策略,既有直接效应也有策略效应,国内学者对捆绑销售的论述仅局限于价格歧视等直接效应,而忽视捆绑销售的策略效应。文章指出了通过捆绑销售来进行价格歧视的局限性以及垄断企业进行捆绑销售的策略效应,并通过一个两阶段模型论述了捆绑销售阻止进入的策略原理:在位企业在一定条件下如何通过捆绑销售来阻止进入。

关 键 词:捆绑销售  直接效应  策略效应  价格歧视  阻止进入
文章编号:1672-934X(2005)04-0054-04
修稿时间:2005-11-10

The strategic effect of the bundling of enterprise monopoly
YE Ze,YU Miao. The strategic effect of the bundling of enterprise monopoly[J]. Journal of Changsha University of Science & Technology, 2005, 20(4): 54-57
Authors:YE Ze  YU Miao
Abstract:Bundling is a common practice in many markets with direct effect as well as strategic effect.However,scholars in China only focus on the study of direct effect of bundling such as price discrimination so that the research of its strategic effect have been ignored.This paper examines the limitations of the effect of price discrimination through bundling and the motivations of bundling with considerations of the strategic effect.Moreover,through a double-staged model it discusses strategic principles for the enter deterrence of bundling,that is,the role of bundling to deter entry for the operating enterprise under specific circumstances.
Keywords:bundling  direct effect  strategic effect  price discrimination  entry deterrence
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