地方政府考核:双重委托人失效及其政策含义

用公共选择理论、委托代理理论和信息经济学的相关理论重新解释地方政府考核失效,基本结论是公共选择制度失效使地方公众丧失了地方政府委托人的身份和考核地方政府的发言权,中央政府不得不成为地方政府的整体委托人,高昂的信息成本却阻碍中央政府成为有效率的、甚至胜任的委托人,这是地方政府考核失效的根源。地方政府控制权过度膨胀和不断扩张导致地方政府本位利益最大化过程中的机会主义难以被有效遏制,产权约束对地方政府而言在很大程度上处于失效状态,以中央政府为委托人的地方政府考核失效被进一步放大。地方政府考核失效集中反映出我国政治经济体制基本面上的深层次问题,地方政府考核是否改进,也是下一步体制改革在关键领域能否有所突破的试金石。

Inefficiency of Local Government's Performance: Two Principal-agent Inefficiency and Its Policy Signification.

By using public choice theory,principal-agent theory,information economy and others,the reinterpre- tation for examining inefficiency of local government's performance leads to the conclusion that the inefficiency of public choice system makes local people lose the identity of local government principal and their examining rights to local government.Inevitably,the central government has to be the total principal of local government,but the high information cost is an obstacle of central government's transformation to an efficient and competent principal,which is the root of examining inefficiency of local government's performance.The excess inflation and extension of local government's control power lead to the difficult limitation of opportunism in its process of maximizing its own benefit. The constraint of property right to local government is inefficient and the examining inefficiency of local government's performance will be extended.That reflects the deep problem in politics and economy system in China,and it will also become the touchstone of breakthrough in the Reform.