人力资本理论与经营者收益分配研究

经营者人力资本使用的主动权掌握在经营者本人手中,物质资本所有者无法从外部强制其高效率工作,同时管理工作的特殊性决定了难以对其实施低成本监督;因此,物质资本所有者只能遵循激励兼容原则,设计有效的激励方案,最大程度地解决委托代理问题。文章遵循短期激励、中期激励和长期激励相结合的原则,设计了由固定薪酬、风险薪酬和弹性薪酬相结合的经营者报酬激励制度,提出了基于经济增加值EVA和市场增加值MVA的经营者长期股权收益激励方案,强化了经营者报酬与企业经营业绩的相关性。人力资本参与企业收益分配的过程是人力资本与物质资本博弈的过程,人力资本参与收益分配的方式和程度是双方博弈的直接产物。

Research on incentive mechanism of entrepreneur salary mode based on the human capital theory

The usage of the human capital of entrepreneur is in control of the entrepreneur himself, the owner of the physical capital can not externally force him to work efficiently. Furthermore, the characteristics of management make it difficult to supervise the entrepreneur at a low cost. So according to the principle of incentive compatibility, the owner of the physical capital had better design an efficient incentive plan to solve the principle-agent problem. Obeying the principle of the combination of short-term, mid-term and long-term incentive methods, this paper puts forward an incentive system for the entrepreneur that combines the fix salary, risky salary and flexible salary. Finally, this paper offers the long-term share-owned incentive mode for the entrepreneur based on Economic Value Added (EVA) and Market Value Added(MVA), enforces the relationship between the entrepreneur salary and the operational achievements of the enterprise. The process of human capital taking part in the property ownership distribution of the firm is a game process between human capital and material capital.