| 解读哥本哈根气候峰会——博弈论视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 蒲勇健.解读哥本哈根气候峰会——博弈论视角[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2010,16(1):1-12. |
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| 作者姓名： | 蒲勇健 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044;重庆大学,发展研究中心,重庆,400044 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章运用博弈论方法将哥本哈根气候谈判的博弈过程进行分解,分析了各国的博弈策略,以及这些策略各自的有效性。论文运用拼盘的方法将气候谈判的复杂博弈分解为一系列简单博弈的叠加,分析其博弈特点;论文还运用推迟谈判博弈和信息不对称的双头垄断交易模型来解释哥本哈根会议失败的原因。论文最后勾勒出气候谈判博弈的未来研究思路。
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| 关 键 词： | 哥本哈根气候谈判 博弈论 减排 |
| 收稿时间： | 2009/12/29 0:00:00 |
A Game Theory Explainantion for the Strategies of Copenhagen Climate Negotiation |
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| PU Yong jian.A Game Theory Explainantion for the Strategies of Copenhagen Climate Negotiation[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Social Sciences Edition),2010,16(1):1-12. |
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| Authors: | PU Yong jian |
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| Institution: | a. College of Economics and Business Administration;b. Development Research Center of Chongqing University;Chongqing 400044;P.R. China |
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| Abstract: | We have put forward a game theory model for describing the Copenhagen climate negotiation in this paper.In the model,strategies and their effectiveness of every countries have been discussed.We decomposed the climate negotiation game into a series subgames ,which are easy analysed.We advanced a theory that the failure of the Copenhagen climate negotiation 2009 can been explained with the postpone negotiation game model and the unsymmetrical information bilateral monopoly trade model. |
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| Keywords: | Copenhagen climate negotiation game theory energy saving and emission reduction |
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