信任关系的不完全信息动态博弈模型

以往理论研究与经验研究均指出"信任"关系具有外部效应,但对这种效应是怎样取得的并无共识.我们尝试建立一个不完全信息动态博弈模型,说明"信任"关系如何产生正的外部性,亦即产生超出个体理性计算之外的利益.我们的分析得出这样的结论,在一个多人互动的环境中,能否达到彼此信任,虽然会受到欺骗者所遭到的惩罚与欺骗利益多少的影响,但主要受到所处环境中具有信任者人数比例的影响.因此,可以说"信任"关系具有正的外部性,信任者人数越多,信任者所享受到的利益越大.

A Dynanmic Game of Incomplete Information Model on Trust

In the past theoretical research and empirical studies the positive effects of social capital have been pointed out,but how to achieve this effect is no consensus.We try to build a dynamic game of incomplete information models on how the social capital generates externality.Our analysis concludes whether the cooperation or trust of each other is achieved or not depends more on the ratio of the people with the social capital to the people without it than on the balance of the punishment and the benefit.Therefore, it can be said that social capital has network externality.The greater the ratio is,the more trust can obtain benefits.