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| 财务治理：集权与分权的经济学分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 雷光勇. 财务治理：集权与分权的经济学分析[J]. 长沙理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2002, 17(2): 51-53 |
| 作者姓名： | 雷光勇 |
| 作者单位： | 长沙电力学院财经系 湖南长沙410077 |
| 摘 要： | 个人的有限理性决定了决策专门知识的取得是一项成本较高的行动 ,而决策权的转移成本低于专门知识转换成本的事实则决定了需要将决策权转移给拥有专门知识的人 ,由此决策才有效率 ;财务专门知识的精细化则决定了需要对财务进行分层治理 ;信息成本与代理成本之间的权衡可以确定企业财务集权治理与分权治理的最佳动态模式 |
| 关 键 词： | 专门知识 信息成本 代理成本 财务治理权 配置 |
Financial Administration:An Economic Analysis of its Central and Decentral Authority |
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| LEI Guang yong. Financial Administration:An Economic Analysis of its Central and Decentral Authority[J]. Journal of Changsha University of Science & Technology, 2002, 17(2): 51-53 | |
| Authors: | LEI Guang yong |
| Abstract: | The individual bounded rationality determines that the acquisition of special knowledge related to policy-decision is an activity with high cost,while the fact that the transfer cost of policy decision authorty is lower than that of special knowledge determines policy-decision authority being transferred to the persons with special knowledge,so as to guarantee the efficiency of policy-decision. The refinement of special financial knowledge decides the requirement of multi-level control of finance. The trade-off between information cost and agency cost can determine the best dynamic model of the centralization and decetralization in the corporate financial administration. |
| Keywords: | special knowledge information cost agency cost financial control authority allocation |
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