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委托—代理理论在电力普遍服务管制政策中的应用研究
引用本文:马芸,赵会茹. 委托—代理理论在电力普遍服务管制政策中的应用研究[J]. 华北电力大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 0(1): 45-49
作者姓名:马芸  赵会茹
作者单位:华北电力大学产业经济研究所,北京市,102206
摘    要:
随着电力体制改革的进行,电力普遍服务的概念也日益受到社会的关注。本文将委托—代理理论应用于电力普遍服务管制问题的研究中。针对电力行业现状,本文分析了参与约束和激励相容约束的实现条件,在对交叉补贴、普遍服务基金和政策性补助等几种电力普遍服务实现机制进行讨论的基础上,提出建立电力普遍服务基金是相对可行的、最有效的解决方案。

关 键 词:电力普遍服务  委托—代理理论  管制  普遍服务基金  激励机制
文章编号:1008-2603(2006)01-0045-05
修稿时间:2005-09-10

On the Application of the Principal-Agent Theory in the Regulation Mechanism of the Electric Universal Service
MA Yun,ZHAO Hui-ru. On the Application of the Principal-Agent Theory in the Regulation Mechanism of the Electric Universal Service[J]. Journal of North China Electric Power University(Social Sciences), 2006, 0(1): 45-49
Authors:MA Yun  ZHAO Hui-ru
Abstract:
With the electric system reform,the definition of the electric universal service has been paid much more attention.This paper takes the principal-agent theory into the analysis of the universal service regulation.On the basis of the actuality of the power industry,the paper lists the implement ation condition of incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint.The paper illustrates some methods of the implement of the universal service,such as the cross subsidy,universal service fund and the policy subsidy and so on.After comparing these methods,it concludes that the universal service fund is the best and most effective scheme.
Keywords:electric universal service  principal-agent model  regulation  universal service fund  incentive mechanism
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