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碳税政策下考虑参考碳排放的供应链成员行为选择研究
引用本文:王君,程先学,蒋雨珊,董振敏.碳税政策下考虑参考碳排放的供应链成员行为选择研究[J].中国管理科学,2021,29(7):128-138.
作者姓名:王君  程先学  蒋雨珊  董振敏
作者单位:天津财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 天津 300222
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究项目(17YJC630097)
摘    要:在由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的低碳供应链中,研究碳税政策下供应链成员的行为选择问题。引入参考碳排放来刻画消费者的低碳偏好对市场需求的影响,在收益共享契约下构建了以制造商主导、零售商跟随的Stackelberg微分博弈模型。分析了制造商的行为选择对参考碳排放、碳排放和定价策略以及双方利润的影响。结果表明,短视制造商会导致更低的产品碳排放,而碳税的高低和初始参考碳排放的大小则会影响供应链成员的定价和减排策略。零售商更倾向于与短视制造商合作,而制造商综合考虑碳税和收益共享比例的大小后会有不同的行为选择。

关 键 词:低碳供应链  参考碳排放  碳税  收益共享契约  微分博弈  
收稿时间:2018-12-08
修稿时间:2019-07-30

Behavior Selection of Supply Chain Members Considering Reference Carbon Emission under Carbon Tax Policy
WANG Jun,CHENG Xian-xue,JIANG Yu-shan,DONG Zhen-min.Behavior Selection of Supply Chain Members Considering Reference Carbon Emission under Carbon Tax Policy[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2021,29(7):128-138.
Authors:WANG Jun  CHENG Xian-xue  JIANG Yu-shan  DONG Zhen-min
Institution:School of Management Science and Engineering, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
Abstract:Greenhouse gas emissions have attracted considerable attention of governments and consumers due to global climate problems. As a key manner, carbon tax policy has been worldwide implemented to reduce emissions. Meanwhile, consumers' increasing awareness of low carbon has begun to affect the purchasing behavior. The reference carbon emission is considered and used to characterize the impact of consumers' low carbon awareness on market demand. The behavior choice of supply chain members is investigated under carbon tax policy. In a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a leading manufacturer and a following retailer, the effects of farsighted and myopic behaviors of the manufacturer on the profits of the supply chain are studied via a Stackelberg differential game model. The manufacturer's optimal carbon emission, wholesale price, retailer's optimal retail price, and their respective profits under both behaviors are deduced. The effects of some parameters on the manufacturer's behavior choice and supply chain profit are illustrated by numerical study. The results show that the myopic manufacturer will produce products with lower carbon emissions. In myopic scenario, the leading manufacturer will not necessarily get higher profit than the retailer. The behavior choice of supply chain members depends on the impact of reference carbon emissions on demand and the ratio of revenue-sharing contract. Given that the revenue-sharing contract cannot fully coordinate the supply chain, a one-time transfer contract is further designed to coordinate the supply chain. The research results can provide theoretical guidance for operators of supply chain firms to make pricing and emission reduction decisions.
Keywords:low-carbon supply chain  reference emission  carbon tax  revenue-sharing contract  differential game  
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