考虑交叉持股的低碳供应链减排与定价决策研究

在碳交易机制下，将交叉持股战略引入到制造商减排决策中，研究供应链企业的减排和定价问题。构建了供应链企业集中决策下的决策模型和交叉持股前后制造商与零售商间的Stackelberg博弈模型，分析比较了不同情形下的企业最优决策和绩效，并以数值算例演示了交叉持股和碳交易价格对企业决策和绩效的影响。研究发现，制造商与零售商交叉持股能够改变碳交易价格对制造商减排量的影响，使得制造商的单位产品减排量一定提高，市场需求提高，在一定条件下批发价和零售价降低；当交叉持股比例满足一定条件时，交叉持股能同时增加制造商与零售商的利润并使供应链达到协调。

Emission Reduction and Pricing Strategies of a Low-carbon Supply Chain Considering Cross-shareholding

Carbon emission reduction could improve the performance of the supply chain, but it also provided opportunities for retailers to enjoy the benefit without cost, which would destroy the manufacturer's emission reduction motivation. Unilateral shareholding and cross-shareholding between supply chain members are common in practice. Studies have shown that the supply chain members could form an interest community through cross-shareholding. Some papers investigate the impact of unilateral shareholding on the supply chain's emission reduction and pricing decisions and found that unilateral shareholding could not coordinate the supply chain. Thus, the cross-shareholding strategy is adopted to study the supply chain's emission reduction and pricing game under the cap-and-trade regulation. The games between the manufacturer and the retailer with Stackelberg models are modeled. The supply chain's optimal decision in the centralized decision scenario, and the equilibriums of decentralized decision scenarios with and without cross-shareholding are explored. Also, the effects of cross-shareholding and carbon-trade price on the enterprises' decision and performance are demonstrated by the numerical examples. It is found that the cross-shareholding between the manufacturer and the retailer could transform the effects of carbon-trade price on the manufacturer's emission reduction, increase the emission reduction per unit product and the market demand, and decrease the wholesale price and retail price under certain conditions. The optimal carbon emission reduction per unit product increased with the increase of shares holding by manufacturer and retailer in each other. If the retailer's shares hold by the manufacturer increases, the manufacturer's profit increases certainly, while the retailer's profit increases only if that shareholding ratio is lower relatively. The impact of the strategy that the retailer hold the manufacturer's shares on the supply chain members' profits is uncertain. But fortunately, the cross-shareholding strategy could simultaneously increase the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer and coordinate the supply chain when the cross-shareholding ratio meet certain conditions.