Prisoner's dilemma from a moral point of view |
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Authors: | John J. Tilley |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Indiana University/Purdue University at Indianapolis, 46202-5140 Indianapolis, IN, USA |
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Abstract: | In a recent issue of this journal, C. L. Sheng claims to havesolved andexplained the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) by studying it from a moral point of view - i.e., by assuming that each player feels sympathy for the other. Sheng does not fully clarify this claim, but there is textual evidence that his point is this: PD's arise only for agents who feel little or no sympathy for each other; they cannot arise in the presence of a high degree of reciprocal sympathy. A high degree of such sympathysolves the PD in that it prevents PD's from arising, and a low degree of itexplains the PD in that it provides an essential condition for the occurrence of that game. This thesis is false, as some examples show. These examples are important; they prevent us from underestimating the problem posed by the PD. |
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Keywords: | Altruism game theory moral point of view prisoner's dilemma sympathy |
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