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论税务稽查行政不作为与税收流失
引用本文:刘丽君.论税务稽查行政不作为与税收流失[J].成都理工大学学报(社会科学版),2007,15(1):53-56.
作者姓名:刘丽君
作者单位:西南财经大学,财税学院,成都,610074
摘    要:根据布坎南的理论,税务稽查部门是一个理性的"经济人",他们基于自己利益得失的考虑,也会采取消极的行政行为或行政不作为,从而导致税收流失.从对税务部门稽查与纳税人偷逃税损益的博弈分析可知,把罚款同税务机关的切身利益挂钩、强制税务干部交纳一定职责保证金或抵押金、用技术手段防止税务征管查而不罚将是治理此类税收流失的有效措施.

关 键 词:税务稽查  行政不作为  税收流失
文章编号:1672-0539(2007)01-053-04
修稿时间:2006年11月20日

On Administrative Nonfeasance in Tax Check and Revenue Run-off
LIU Li-jun.On Administrative Nonfeasance in Tax Check and Revenue Run-off[J].Journal of Chengdu University of Technology:Social Sciences,2007,15(1):53-56.
Authors:LIU Li-jun
Abstract:According to J.Buchanan's theory,the tax check departments are rational "economic person",thus they will take passive administration or nonfeasance in view of their own interests,which leads to tax run-off.By the game analysis of profit and loss between tax check and tax dodging or tax evasion,it can be found that the effective measures to prevent tax from running off are to combine the forfeit with the interest of tax check department,to force revenuer to pay some responsibility deposit and to use technical means to prevent tax collector from just checking but not punishing.
Keywords:tax check  administrative nonfeasance  revenue run-off
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