| R&D合作与政府最优政策博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 鲁文龙,陈宏民.R&D合作与政府最优政策博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2003,11(1):60-62. |
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| 作者姓名： | 鲁文龙 陈宏民 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学管理学院 上海 200030 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部博士点基金资助项目(20010248038) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文在开放的经济环境下,对国内和国外两个企业的R&D行为及政府的补贴政策行为进行了分析。结果表明:(1)当企业间的R&D交流很少时,两个企业的R&D投资存在此消彼长的关系;而当企业间存在密切的R&D交流时,两个企业的R&D投资可以互相促进;(2)企业间的技术交流与合作是必要的,可以有利于整个社会福利的提高;(3)政府更倾向于补贴本国企业。
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| 关 键 词： | Cournot竞争 R&D 政府补贴 技术合作 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-207(2003)01-0060-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2001-04-09; |
| 修稿时间： | 2001年4月9日 |
The Analysis of R＆D Cooperation and The Government Optimal Policy with Game Theory |
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| LU Wen-long,CHEN Hong-min.The Analysis of R＆D Cooperation and The Government Optimal Policy with Game Theory[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2003,11(1):60-62. |
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| Authors: | LU Wen-long CHEN Hong-min |
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| Institution: | Management School, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200032, China |
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| Abstract: | Under the opening circumstances,this paper analyzed a domestic firm and a foreign one’s R&;D behavior and government’s subsidy policy.The results are as follows:first,when there exists little R&;D intercommunication,the R&;D investment of one firm will increase,and another will decrease;however,when there exists close R&;D intercommunication,the two firms’ R&;D investments will be promoted each other.Second,intercommunication between firms is necessary,and that will improve social welfare.Third,governments are inclined to subsidize domestic firms. |
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| Keywords: | Cournot competition R&D government’s subsidy technology cooperation |
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