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我国保险公司合作竞争的博弈分析
引用本文:周延,王瑞玲.我国保险公司合作竞争的博弈分析[J].深圳大学学报(人文社会科学版),2011,28(5):94-99.
作者姓名:周延  王瑞玲
作者单位:1. 华东师范大学国际金融与风险管理研究中心、金融与统计学院,上海,200241
2. 中国建设银行河南省许昌分行,河南许昌,461000
摘    要:竞争与合作相互依存,互利共生。纯粹的竞争或合作均不利于保险市场的健康发展。竞争抑或合作的最大困扰乃收益分配问题。通过构建博弈模型对我国保险公司之间竞争与合作的关系进行博弈分析,可以看到在完全信息静态博弈、非完全信息静态博弈和完全信息动态博弈三种情况下保险公司竞争与合作的难点,因此需要采取相应的对策。

关 键 词:保险公司  合作竞争  博弈分析

Cooperation and Competition in Chinas Insurance Sector: a Game Theory Perspective
ZHOU Yan,WANG Rui-ling.Cooperation and Competition in Chinas Insurance Sector: a Game Theory Perspective[J].Journal of Shenzhen University(Humanities & Social Sciences),2011,28(5):94-99.
Authors:ZHOU Yan  WANG Rui-ling
Institution:ZHOU Yan1,WANG Rui-ling2(1.Center of International Finance and Risk Management,East China Normal University School of Finance and Statistics,Shanghai 200241,2.Xuchang Branch of China Construction Bank,Xuchang 461000)
Abstract:Competition and cooperation often come in tandem.Mere competition and complete cooperation can impede and forestall healthy development of the insurance market.Over-competition and inadequate cooperation will weaken China's insurance sector.The biggest issue to healthy competition and cooperation is profit sharing.This paper constructs several models to identify the difficulty spots regarding cooperation and competition among China's insurance companies,namely perfect information simultaneous,imperfect info...
Keywords:insurance companies  cooperation and competition  choice of strategies  Game Analysis  
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