国有土地委托代理关系的制度经济学分析

用委托代理理论视角考察我国国有土地资产运行,可以发现其中存在复杂的委托代理关系。由于公民、国务院、各级政府、用地者都有各自的效用目标函数,加之信息不对称,所以在整个委托代理链条中产生的代理成本较高,委托人的利益易被扭曲。解决这一问题一是要建立严格有效的监督机制,加强国有土地所有者对经营权的约束;二是要合理规范中央与地方的利益分配,完善政府内部监督机制和考核制度;三是加快土地市场体系的建设,利用市场竞争机制约束政府代理人的行为。

Principal-agent Relationship of State-owned Land: An Analysis from Institutional Economics

In the perspective of principal-agent theory,we can find a complicated principal-agent relationship in the performance of the state-owned land property of China.Because the citizens,the State Council,the land users and governments at all levels have respective objective function of effectiveness with asymmetrical information,a high proxy cost will arise in the principal-agent chain and the trustee's benefit will be easily twisted.To solve this problem,we should establish a strict and effective oversight mechanism so as to limit the management right of the state-owned landowners.We should reasonably distribute the interest between the central authorities and the local authorities, and perfect interior surveillance mechanism and assessment system inside the governments.Futhermore,we should speed up the construction of the land market system,by which the behavior of government agents can be restrained with the market competition mechanism.