| 地方政府联动治理农业面源污染的行为分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈红.地方政府联动治理农业面源污染的行为分析[J].东北农业大学学报(社会科学版),2010,8(4):22-26. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈红 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北林业大学,黑龙江,哈尔滨,150040 |
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| 摘 要： | 明晰农业面源污染的特征，指出地方政府对农业面源污染治理中的不可替代的作用，运用完全信息静态博弈模型对地方政府在农业面源污染治理行为进行分析，得出地方政府在个体理性支配下达到纳什均衡时，农业面源污染治理投入总量小于整体理性支配下帕累托最优时农业面源污染治理投入之和。为实现整体理性支配下帕累托最优，必须实现地方政府联动治理农业面源污染。本文着重分析了地方政府联动治理农业面源污染的动力、过程和保障机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 农业面源污染 地方政府 联动治理 |
Game Analysis of Local Governments with Joint Governance in Agricultural Non- point Pollution |
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| Chen Hong.Game Analysis of Local Governments with Joint Governance in Agricultural Non- point Pollution[J].Journal of Northeast Agricultural University:Social Science Edition,2010,8(4):22-26. |
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| Authors: | Chen Hong |
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| Institution: | Chen Hong (Northeast Forestry University,Harbin Heilongjiang 150040) |
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| Abstract: | The thesis first proposed the characteristics of agricultural non-point pollution.It pointed out the important role of local governments in agricultural non-point pollution.Static game model of complete information was used to analyze the input in the pollution.The conclusion was that when local governments with personal rationality came to Nash equilibrium,the total input was less than that with overall rationality in Pareto optimal state.In order to treat agricultural non-point pollution together and reac... |
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| Keywords: | agricultural non-point pollution local governments joint governance |
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