供应链渠道协调的收入共享契约模型

研究了委托销售条件下的供应链收入共享契约协调问题。在该契约下,零售商决定收入共享比例,供应商决定产品零售价格和生产数量,并保留产品所有权,双方所有关于需求、成本等信息都是对称的。综合考虑了产品残值收益和缺货损失情况,建立了以零售商为主方、供应商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型,分析了委托销售下分散供应链决策同集中供应链决策的关系,探讨了系统参数对供应链及其成员利润的影响,并进行了数值计算。研究表明,供应链及其成员绩效受两个系统参数,即需求价格弹性和零售商成本分摊比例的影响,从而为契约双方针对不同产品和各自成本结构签订最优契约提供决策依据。

Model of Revenue-sharing Contract for the Coordination of Supply Chain Channels

Is studied the coordination of the contract for supply chain revenue-sharing under consignment sales.The salvage value and shortage cost are considered,and a Stackelberg game model is developed where the retailer is a leader and the supplier is a follower.The relationship of decisions between decentralized and centralized supply chain under consignment sales are analyzed.The impacts of system parameters on the supply chain and its members' performance are discussed and the numerical calculation is done.The results showed that both the supply chain and the performance its members ' are affected by two system parameters,demand price elasticity and retailer's cost share,offering a decision-making support for the contract members to sign an optimal contract aiming at different product and each other's cost structure.