中国煤矿安全监察监管演化博弈有效稳定性控制

针对中国煤矿安全监察监管过程中复杂动态博弈且多方参与的问题,通过分析煤矿安全监察监管系统的演化博弈关系,构建国家监察机构、地方监管机构和煤矿企业3个种群所组成的演化博弈模型,并将基于系统动力学的计算机仿真手段与动态演化思想相结合,对上述演化博弈模型进行求解与均衡点稳定性分析。结果发现:中国煤矿安全监察监管的演化博弈过程出现反复波动、震荡发展的趋势,表明博弈过程不存在演化稳定策略。进而对此问题进行博弈的有效稳定性控制情景研究,提出动态惩罚-激励控制情景,并对此控制情景下的演化博弈稳定性进行仿真分析与理论证明,结果发现在动态惩罚-激励控制情景下系统演化博弈过程的波动性得到有效控制,即博弈过程存在演化稳定策略,且在此稳定策略均衡状态下煤矿企业违法行为得到有效控制。

Effective Stability Control Research of Evolutionary Game in China's Coal Mine Safety Supervision

In view of the problem of different interests and influences of stakeholders and their complicatedly dynamic game in the process of coal mining safety supervision and regulation in China, this paper analyzed the systemically evolutionary game of stakeholders in the coal mining safety supervision and regulation system, which includes the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMS),the Local Regulation Departments of Coal Mine Safety, and coal enterprises. Moreover, the game was simulated by combining evolutionary game theory and system dynamics and the simulation results showed that strategy selections of the three stakeholders fluctuate repeatedly which indicates that evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in the game process. Therefore, the dynamic penalty-incentive measure was proposed to control the fluctuations and then simulated again. The simulation results showed that the measure can effectively restrain the fluctuations and present an ideal evolutionary stable strategy under which coal enterprises will choose safety production as their optimal strategy.