高管激励对中国企业海外并进型战略的影响研究——基于激励因素及高管任期的实证研究

学术界关于海外并进型战略的研究由来已久,但是缺乏对高管激励与战略机制之间关系的探索。基于委托—代理理论和激励理论,利用中国沪深A股制造业上市公司2006—2017年数据,从高管激励的视角分别研究了高管股权激励和控制权激励对并进型战略平衡度的影响和作用机制。实证结果表明:高管股权激励与公司海外并进型战略的有机平衡度呈正相关关系,高管控制权激励与公司海外并进型战略的有机平衡度呈“倒U形”关系,高管任期负向调节股权激励及控制权激励与企业海外并进型战略有机平衡度之间的关系。跨国公司应充分利用高管任期和高管激励模式之间的替代效应,形成激励效用最大化的管理层权力体系。上述研究完善了新兴市场国家企业对外直接投资及公司治理的相关理论,为中国企业国际化过程中提高并进型战略平衡度和海外绩效提供了新思路。

Research on Impact of Executive Incentives on Chinese Enterprises' Overseas Ambidextrous Strategy:Empirical Study Based on Executive Incentives and Tenure

It has been long for the research on the overseas ambidextrous strategy while exploration of the mechanism between executive incentives and ambidextrous strategy is far from enough.Based on the theories of principal-agent theory and motivation theory,this paper starts from the perspective of executive incentive by using the panel data of China s manufacturing A-share listed companies during the years from 2006 to 2017.It focuses on the influence of equity incentive and private benefit of control exerting on the dynamic balance of overseas ambidextrous strategy in multi-national companies as well as its mechanism.The conclusions are as follows.The equity incentive is positively related to the dynamic balance of overseas ambidextrous strategy.The relationship between the firm s overseas ambidextrous strategy and private benefit of control shows an inverse U-shape;The TMT s tenure negatively moderates the relationship between executive incentive and enterprise s ambidexterity.Multinational enterprises can fully utilize the supplementary effect between executive tenure and incentives to maximize incentives by a management system.This research has contribution to foreign direct investment theory in emerging economy as well as corporate governance theory,providing a fresh insight for increasing ambidexterity and performance of Chinese multinational companies.