负债企业控制权转移的时机和均衡价格

应用实物期权博弈论和一般均衡理论,推导出了负债企业在信息不完美条件下控制权转移最优时机和均衡价格的解析解, 并对最优时机和均衡价格的主要影响因素进行敏感性分析。研究结果表明: 在其他条件不变的前提下, 目标企业的规模越大、兼并双方购买沉没成本越小、控股比例越高、购买者期望协同效应越大、息票率越高,税率越高, 则均会导致控制权转移越快, 转移的均衡价格越低。目标企业所处的产业增长率和波动率越高, 则控制权转移越快, 转移的均衡价格越低,并具有双重效应。控制权转移的时机和转移均衡价格不是控制因子的单调函数。

Optimal Timing and Equilibrium Price for Control Rights Transfer of the Company with Debt

By applying real option game theory and CGE theory, the optimal timing and the equilibrium price under the condition of imperfect information for the controlling shares transfer are given for the company with debt, and the sensibility analysis is made for the main factors which affect the optimal timing and the equilibrium price. The result shows that cassuming other conditions remains unchanged, it the greater the scale of the target company, the smaller M and A sunk cost, the higher the percentage the controlling shareholder holding, the greater the expected synergies,the higher the coupon, the higher the tax rate is, tren the transferring of the control is sooner, the equilibrium price is lower. The higher the industry growing the rate and the volatility is, the faster the transfer of the control is, the equilibrium price is lower and there is a double effect. The timing and the equilibrium price of the control right are not the monotonic function of the control factor.